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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of the holonomy interpretation
of classical electromagnetism. As has been argued by Richard Healey and
Gordon Belot, classical electromagnetism on this interpretation evinces a
form of nonseparability, something that otherwise might have been thought
of as confined to non-classical physics. Consideration of the differences
between this classical nonseparability and quantum nonseparability shows
that the nonseparability exhibited by the classical electromagnetism on the
holonomy interpretation is closer to separability than might at first appear.
1 Introduction
How are we to think of classical electromagnetic fields? There is a view, which
has its roots in the work of Wu and Yang (1975), and which has been advanced
in the philosophical literature by Richard Healey (1997, 2004, 2007) and Gordon
Belot (1998), according to which the traditional representation of classical elec-
tromagnetism, in terms of electric and magnetic fields (or, in Lorentz covariant
formulation, in terms of the Faraday tensor), is not the most perspicuous rep-
resentation of the physical content of the theory. In its place is offered what
Healey (2007) calls the holonomy interpretation. This rests on a representation
of electromagnetism that takes as its basic elements assignments of unit complex
numbers to loops in spacetime. As both Healey and Belot have pointed out, the
holonomy interpretation has consequences for the metaphysics of classical elec-
tromagnetism; electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation evinces a form
of nonseparability, which one might otherwise have thought was a hallmark of
non-classical physics. This, in turn has consequences for the view that Lewis calls
Humean Supervenience (Healey, 2007, 124–27).
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These points are well taken. Nevertheless, there remain important differences
between quantum nonseparability and the nonseparability exhibited by the holon-
omy interpretation of classical electromagnetism. An examination of these differ-
ences, I shall argue below, shows that the nonseparability exhibited by the classi-
cal electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation is closer to separability than
might at first appear. Furthermore, the consequences for Humean Supervenience
are not as dire as would seem.
2 Interpretations of Classical Electromagnetism
In his book, Healey (2007) distinguishes three main lines of approach to classical
gauge theories, such as electromagnetism. One is the “no new gauge potential
properties view.” On this view, the electromagnetic potentials represent no new
properties; an electromagnetic potential represents physical reality only insofar as
it encodes the electromagnetic field, represented by the Faraday tensor. This runs
into trouble when we consider the manner in which electromagnetic fields couple to
a quantum wave function. As the Aharonov-Bohm effect dramatically illustrates
(though the issue is, of course, not confined to that particular set-up), the coupling
between electric and magnetic fields and the wave-function of a charged particle
cannot be a local coupling. We can achieve local coupling by expressing the
electromagnetic field in terms of the electromagnetic potential Aµ. This has been
taken as an argument for the reality of the potential (notably, by Feynman (1964,
§15-5)). A representation of electromagnetism in terms of the electromagnetic
potential, however, has the disadvantage that it is not gauge-invariant. Any two
electromagnetic potentials that are related by a gauge transformation are regarded
as representing the same physical state of affairs.
The integral of the potential around a closed curve is gauge invariant, as is
the Dirac phase factor
exp[−ie
h¯
∮
C
Aµdx
µ].
Wu and Yang (1975) argued that the set of all such phase factors—that is, a map-
ping from closed curves in spacetime to complex numbers of unit modulus—yields
a representation that captures all of the physical content of the theory without
superfluous structure. Such a representation, according to Wu and Yang, “con-
stitutes an intrinsic and complete description of electromagnetism” (p. 3845).
Healey (1997, 2004, 2007) and Belot (1998) have examined the consequences of
taking this representation of classical electromagnetism, the holonomy represen-
tation, as basic, and in particular, its consequences for locality and separability.
Locality and separability are conditions on physical theories, both found in the
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writings of Einstein on quantum theory (though not always clearly distinguished
by Einstein; it is due to the work of Don Howard (1985) that these have widely
come to be recognized as distinct principles). Separability, as Einstein puts it, is
the condition that “things claim an existence independent of one another, insofar
as these things ‘lie in different parts of space’” (Einstein 1948, 321; tr. Howard
1985, 187). Locality, or the Prinzip der Nahewirkung, is the condition that, if
A and B are spatially separated systems, “an external influence on A has no
immediate effect on B.” (Einstein 1948, 321–22; tr. Howard 1985, 188).1 For
Einstein, (classical) field theories were the epitomes of theories satisfying these
conditions. Speaking of the separability condition, he wrote,
Field theory has carried out this principle to the extreme, in that
it localizes within infinitely small (four-dimensional) space-elements
the elementary things existing independently of one another that it
takes as basic, as well as the elementary laws it postulates for them.
(Einstein 1948, 321; tr. Howard 1985, 188.)
And the locality condition, according to Einstein, “is applied consistently only in
field theory” (Einstein 1948, 322; tr Howard 1985, 188).
It has become commonplace to say that classical state descriptions are sepa-
rable, quantum state descriptions, nonseparable. The holonomy view of classical
electromagnetism has introduced a complication into this neat dichotomy; on this
view the state descriptions of classical electromagnetism exhibit a form of non-
separability (see §5, below). The argument for the holonomy view, to be sure,
rests on quantum considerations, but it is a classical field, nonetheless, that is at
issue. If we take it as a principle that we should let our best physical theories be
our guides in our views on matters ontological, then we should take Belot’s and
Healey’s arguments seriously in considering how to think about classical electro-
magnetic fields.2
If we accept the holonomy view of the classical electromagnetic field, and
accept that, on this view, classical electromagnetism yields nonseparable state
descriptions, does this obliterate any distinction between quantum nonseparability
and the sort of nonseparability exhibited by classical electromagnetism? It would
1I take Belot’s condition of synchronic locality to be essentially equivalent to
separability, and his diachronic locality, to what we are here calling locality. See
Belot (1998, 540).
2Belot (1998, 532) has expressed the point dramatically: “until the discovery of
the Aharonov-Bohm effect, we misunderstood what electromagnetism was telling
us about the world.”
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be rash to say so, and neither Healey nor Belot do.3 It is, therefore useful to
examine the differences between quantum nonseparability and the nonseparability
of classical electromagnetism.
3 Quantum nonseparability
As a warm-up, it is useful to rehearse some familiar facts about quantum nonsep-
arability.
If two quantum systems A, B, are in an entangled state, the reduced states
of A and B—that is, restriction of attention to what the state says about mea-
surements performed on A, and what it says about measurements performed on
B—do not suffice to determine the state of the combined system, as the reduced
states underdetermine the correlations between measurement results on the two
systems. This is a form of holism that does not exist in classical mechanics, as, in
classical mechanics, a complete specification of the states of the parts that make
up a whole determines the state of the whole.
Comparison of the classical and quantum case is facilitated by the use of a
framework that subsumes both theories. Both classical and quantum systems can
be represented as theories whose observables are the self-adjoint part of a C∗-
algebra (see Clifton et al. (2003)). The key difference is that classical observables
can be thought of as functions on an underlying phase space; this entails that the
algebra of observables is abelian. A consequence of this is that pure states are
dispersion-free (that is, they assign definite values to all observables), and this
in turn entails that the state space of a composite system contains no entangled
states.
A little more formally: let A, B be two physical systems, with associated C∗-
algebras A, B. We associate with the composite system consisting of A and B the
algebra C = A ∨ B, that is, the smallest C∗-algebra containing A and B.4 Let ω
be a state5 of C, and let ωA, ωB be the restrictions of ω to A, B, respectively. If
ω is a pure state, and either A or B is abelian, then ωA and ωB are also pure, and
ω is uniquely determined by specification of ωA and ωB (that is: there is only one
state of C that is compatible with ωA and ωB being the restrictions of ω to their
respective subalgebras). If, on the other hand, both A and B are non-abelian, as
will be the case when both systems are treated as quantum systems, there will be
3In his reply (Healey, 1999) to Maudlin (1998), who emphasized the disanalo-
gies between the case of classical electromagnetism and quantum nonseparability,
Healey made it clear that he was not denying the reality of these disanalogies.
4We assume that AB = BA for all A ∈ A, B ∈ B.
5That is, a normalized, positive linear functional.
4
pure states ω that are not product states. Such a state is not uniquely determined
by the reduced states ωA and ωB. This is true even if A and B are systems located
some spatial distance apart. Thus, quantum states violate what Healey (1997, p.
26) has called Spatial Separability.
Spatial Separability. The qualitative intrinsic physical properties of a
compound system are supervenient on those of its spatially separated
component systems together with the spatial relations among these
component systems.
4 The holonomy representation of the classical
electromagnetic field.
To set up the holonomy representation, some terminology is needed. We begin
with a spacetime manifold M . A curve in M is a continuous, piecewise smooth
mapping C : [0, 1] → M . A closed curve is a curve whose beginning point and
endpoints are the same point, called its base point. If the endpoint of curve C1
is the beginning point of curve C2, we define the composition C2 ◦ C1 in the
obvious way. The image of a curve is the set of points in M that it traces out. A
closed curve is thin if it is possible to shrink it down to a point while remaining
within its image. A loop is the oriented image of a non-self-intersecting closed
curve. Closed curves C1, C2 are thinly equivalent iff C1 ◦C−12 is thin. A hoop is an
equivalence class of thinly equivalent closed curves.6 We will denote by [C] the
hoop containing a closed curve C.
Pick some point o ∈M , and consider the set of closed curves with base-point
o. The associated set of hoops can be given a natural group structure. For any
two hoops α, β, take curves C1 ∈ α, C2 ∈ β, with common base point o. Define
the composition β ◦ α as [C2 ◦ C1]. The identity element is the class of curves
equivalent to the trivial curve that begins at o and remains there. For any hoop
α, we can define its inverse α−1 as [C−1], where C is any element of α. Clearly,
α−1 ◦α is [C−1 ◦C], which is the identity element. Let Lo be this group of hoops.
We can define a holonomy as a smooth7 homomorphism from Lo into a suitable
Lie group; this gives rise to a representation of these as holonomies of a connection
on a principal fiber bundle with that Lie group as structure group.
6The terminology adopted here is that used in Healey (2007). In Healey (2004),
hoops are called loops (following Gambini and Pullin 1996) and loops are called
rings.
7For the meaning of “smooth” that is relevant here, see condition H3 of Barrett
(1991).
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In the case of electromagnetism, things are particularly simple. The structure
group is just U(1), the set of rotations of a circle. This group has a natural
representation as complex numbers of unit modulus; thus, in electromagnetism, a
holonomy assigns to each hoop in Lo a complex number of unit modulus. Written
in terms of the electromagnetic potential, the value of a holonomy H assigns to a
hoop γ is,
H(γ) = exp[
ie
h¯
∮
C
Aµdx
µ],
where C is any closed curve in the equivalence-class γ. Since the group U(1) is
abelian, holonomies are independent of base point.
Any closed curve is composed of non-intersecting curves, whose image points
are loops. To specify an electromagnetic holonomy on the group of hoops, there-
fore, it suffices to specify a value for each loop (since these values are independent
of base point). At the price of some abuse of notation, we will write H(l) for the
value of H on a hoop γl containing a curve whose image is the loop l.
The holonomy interpretation of electromagnetism takes as its basic description
of the electromagnetic state of the world an assignment of holonomy values to
loops in spacetime. The electromagnetic state of a region R of spacetime is an
assignment of holonomy values to loops in R. These values will not be independent
of each other. Suppose loops l1 and l2 are the images of closed curves C1, C2, with
common base point. It may happen that there is a curve C3, thinly equivalent to
C2 ◦ C1, whose oriented image is a loop, which we will denote l1 ⊕ l2. Because a
holonomy must respect the group structure of the group of hoops, we must have,
for any holonomy H,
H(l1 ⊕ l2) = H(l2)H(l1).
Call this the loop composition condition.
Though doing so is a bit more complicated than in the traditional represen-
tation, it is possible to write the classical action for electromagnetism in terms of
loop-dependent quantities (see Ugon et al. 1994, and Gambini and Pullin 1996,
§4.6). It is also possible to write Maxwell’s equations in terms of loop-dependent
quantities. These preserve the expected relations of dependence. Let Σ2, Σ2
are two maximal spacelike hypersurfaces in Minkowski spacetime, with Σ2 to the
future of Σ1. Let R2 be some subset of Σ2, and let R1 be the past domain of
dependence of R2 in Σ1. Then the holonomy-state of R2 is determined by the
holonomy-state of R1. Thus, as Healey (2007, 127) notes, there is no threat to
relativistic locality from the holonomy interpretation.
We can also construct a holonomy interpretation of a classical non-abelian
Yang-Mills theory. The holonomy is now a homomorphism from the group of
hoops into a non-abelian Lie group. These holonomies will not, in the non-abelian
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case, be independent of the base point o, and will not be gauge-invariant. What
will be gauge-invariant and independent of base point will be the Wilson loops.
WA(γ) = Tr
[
P exp
(
i
∮
C
Aµdx
µ
)]
,
where P denotes the path-ordered product. It can be shown (see Gambini and
Pullin (1996, §3.4.2)) that all the gauge-invariant content of the theory can be
reconstructed from the these Wilson loops.
5 Holonomy and nonseparability: the classical
electromagnetic field
Suppose we represent a classical electromagnetic field in this way: as a smooth
assignment of elements of U(1) to loops in spacetime. Any particular holonomy
H will represent a state of the electromagnetic field, and the restriction of a state
to the set of observables associated with a spacetime region R will be given by
{H(l)}, where l ranges over loops in R.
This immediately eliminates any version of separability that requires physical
states to supervene on properties assigned to spacetime points. Call this Pointil-
liste Separability.8
Pointilliste Separability. All physical processes occupying a region R of
space-time supervene on an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical
properties at spacetime points in R.
But perhaps we have reasons to reject pointillisme, independent of the issues we’re
discussing here.9 On the traditional view, electromagnetic fields are specified by
specifying fields B, E, or, in covariant form, by specifying the electromagnetic
field tensor field Fµν . At first glance, we have here a perfect instance of pointil-
liste separability: the electromagnetic tensor field is an assignment of a tensor to
each point of spacetime. The question is whether these can be regarded as prop-
erties intrinsic to the spacetime points. Jeremy Butterfield (2006) has argued
8The negation of this is called Non-separability in Healey (1991, 1994, 2007).
9Pointillisme is defined by Butterfield as “the doctrine that a physical the-
ory’s fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and
represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there”
(Butterfield, 2006, 709). He credits Lewis with appropriating the art movement’s
name for this doctrine.
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that instantaneous velocities of a classical point particle are to be regarded as ex-
trinsic but local to the spacetime points at which they obtain. Extrinsic because
possession of a velocity at an instant has implications for matters of fact at other
instants, and local because the velocity of a particle at time t is determined by
the particle’s trajectory in any neighborhood of t, no matter how small.
A similar argument can be given for the vectors assigned to points by an
electromagnetic field, or, for that matter, by any field. Let us note, first of all, that
a vector (or tensor) field is usually taken to be a smooth assignment of a vector (or
tensor) to each point of the spacetime manifold. The requirement of smoothness
means that assignment of a field value to a point x has implications for assignments
at points other than x. Field values are extrinsic but local to points. This meshes
well with the physical interpretation of the field. The electromagnetic field at
the space time point determines the acceleration of a test charge at that point,
as a function of its velocity; anti-pointillisme about velocities and accelerations,
therefore, would seem to dictate anti-pointillisme about electromagnetic fields.
Let us, therefore, take the electromagnetic field value assigned to a point to
be extrinsic but local to that point. Note that this also meshes well with the
quantum treatment of fields; in standard quantum field theory, quantum fields do
not associate operators with spacetime points, but rather operator-valued distri-
butions, which yield operators (which represent observables) when smeared with
suitable test-functions.
The vector assigned to a point by a vector field is extrinsic but local to a
point. But what of extended regions? Suppose R is a subset of some manifold
M , to each point p of which is assigned a vector Vp by a vector field V . Each of
these assignments is local to the point p, meaning that, for any neighbourhood
np of p, no matter how small, the vector assigned to p carries no implications for
vectors assigned to points outside of np. Does it follow that the totality of such
assignments is local to R?
Oddly enough, no. If M is ordinary 3-space, then, for some regions R, an
assignment of vectors to all points in R carries implications for assignments outside
of R, and these implications are not confined to an arbitrarily close neighbourhood
of R.10 This is because Stoke’s theorem applies, which says that, for any smooth
vector field F, any closed curve C, and any capping surface S of C,∮
F · dl =
∫
S
(∇× F) · dS
In words: the line integral of F around the curve C is equal to the surface integral
over a surface bounded by C of the component of the curl of F normal to the
10I take a neighborhood of a region R to be any open set that contains R.
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surface. An assignment of field values to points in the image of C that yields a
nonzero line integral around C cannot be extended smoothly to a field that is
curl-free everywhere on S.
If we abandon pointillisme, what suggests itself first, as a non-pointilliste ver-
sion of separability, is
Naive Patchy Separability. For any spacetime region R, and any open
covering {nα} of R, all physical processes occupying a region R of
space-time supervene on an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical
properties to elements of {nα}.
This condition is too strong, as it is not satisfied by vector fields, the paradigm
case of separability. This is because some of the open sets in the covering may be
ring-shaped, and a vector field’s assignment of vectors to all points in such a set
is an extrinsic property of such a set.
To better capture the intuition behind a non-pointilliste version of separability,
we restrict the patches by requiring the covering to consist of open balls. For any
point x, the open ball of radius  centered at x is the set of points of distance less
than  from x.
Patchy Separability. For any spacetime region R, all physical processes
occupying a region R of space-time supervene on an assignment of
qualitative intrinsic physical properties to elements of any covering
consisting of open balls centred at points in R.
This is a version of Healey’s Weak Separability (Healey, 2007, 46), which is equiv-
alent to Belot’s Synchronic locality (Belot, 1998, 540). As Belot (1998, 544) and
Healey (2007, 125) point out, this also fails, on the holonomy view. Consider the
set-up of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, and let R be a ring that circles the solenoid.
If we cover this ring with small patches, the intrinsic properties assigned to those
patches will be holonomies on loops within the patches. If we choose our cover
so that none of the patches contain loops that circle the solenoid, the holonomy
assigned to any loop contained in a patch will be 1. This fact, that all loops in
elements of our covering are assigned the value 1, leaves undetermined the value
assigned to a loop in R that circles the solenoid.
To tie this in with the considerations raised in §3, we can associate a C∗−algebra
with a spacetime region R region by forming a suitable set of bounded functions of
the holonomy values in R; since holonomy values are just complex numbers, this
will be an abelian algebra. A holonomy-state of R will assign holonomy-values
to all loops in R, which will determine values for all functions in the algebra we
associate with R. Take regions A, B, such that R = A ∪ B, and consider a
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holonomy-state of R. This will not be uniquely determined by specification of
values of the holonomy on all loops in A and all loops in B. Thus, there might
seem to be a tension here with what was said in §3, about absence of nonsepara-
bility in the state of a composite system whose observable-algebra is abelian. A
crucial assumption there, however, was that, if algebras A, B are associated with
systems A, B, the algebra associated with the composite of A and B is A ∨ B,
the smallest algebra containing both A and B.11 Since there will be loops asso-
ciated with a composite system that are not composed of loops belonging to the
parts, this assumption fails for the holonomy interpretation of electromagnetism.
Classical electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation achieves nonsepara-
bility, not via entanglement, but because there are observables associated with
a composite system whose values are underdetermined even by an assignment of
dispersion-free states to the component systems.
Patchy Separability fails because it contains a quantification over all space-
time regions R. However, if we consider a simply connected region R, then it is
true that, for any open covering {nα} of R, the value of a holonomy H will be
determined by its values on loops contained in elements of {nα}. The idea is this.
Given a loop σ, take two points x, y on σ, and join them by a path g. Let c1 be a
loop that starts at x, traverses σ until it reaches y, and then takes g−1 back to x.
Let c2 be a loop that starts at x, traverses g to y, and then traverses σ back to x.
Let σ1, σ2 be the segments of σ traversed by c1, c2, respectively. Then we have
c1 = g
−1 ◦ σ1
c2 = σ2 ◦ g
σ = σ2 ◦ σ1.
Then, for any holonomy H
H(c2 ◦ c1) = H(σ2 ◦ g ◦ g−1 ◦ σ1) = H(σ2 ◦ σ1) = H(σ),
and so the value of H on σ is determined by its values on c1 and c2.
H(σ) = H(c1 ◦ c2) = H(c1)H(c2).
We can further subdivide c1 and c2, and so on, and, as long as R is simply
connected, we will be able to continue this process until each of the component
loops lies within an element of our open cover {nα}.
Thus, the following condition, weaker than Patchy Separability, will be satis-
fied.
11This assumption is introduced without comment by Clifton et al. (2003). It
is interesting to find a setting in which it fails in a natural way.
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Patchy Separability for Simply-Connected Regions. For any simply-
connected spacetime region R, all physical processes occupying a re-
gion R of space-time supervene on an assignment of qualitative intrin-
sic physical properties to elements of any covering consisting of open
balls centred at points in R.
In particular the state of the whole world (that is, either the state of M , or
the state of some maximal spacelike surface in M , depending on whether one is
in a 4-dimensionalist or 3-dimensionalist mood) will supervene on assignments
of states to arbitrarily small regions, if spacetime (or, for the 3-dimensionalist,
space) is simply connected. Separability fails only when we consider subregions of
the world, and ones with special properties, at that. We have, when M is simply
connected,
Global Patchy Separability. All physical processes supervene on an
assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical properties to elements of
any covering of M consisting of open balls centred at points in M .
Let us consider again spatial separability.
Spatial Separability. The qualitative intrinsic physical properties of a
compound system are supervenient on those of its spatially separated
component systems together with the spatial relations among these
component systems.
If A and B are spatially separated regions, then there are no loops in A ∪ B
that are not in either A or B. It follows that a holonomy assigning elements of
U(1) to loops in A∪B supervenes on assignments to loops in A and B. Classical
electromagnetism, on the holonomy view, satisfies spatial separability.
If we ask what the holonomy view requires a conservative classical metaphysi-
cian (ccm) to abandon, then certainly, pointillisme is something that has to go.
But pointillisme should be rejected even on the traditional field interpretation of
electromagnetism. Patchy Separability, with its quantification over all spacetime
regions whatsoever, though satisfied by the field interpretation, is violated by the
holonomy interpretation of electromagnetism.12 But a ccm who rejects pointil-
lisme will be able to retain Spatial Separability and, provided her spacetime is
simply connected, Global Patchy Separability. Thus, there is a marked difference
between the form of non-separability exhibited by classical electromagnetism on
the holonomy interpretation, and quantum non-separability, as the latter requires
rejection of both Spatial Separability and Global Patchy Separability.
12Unless the ccm is willing to make a move to a claim that subsets of spacetime
that are not simply connected don’t count as bona fide regions.
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6 On Humean Supervenience
In the introduction to Volume II of his Philosophical Papers, Lewis formulates the
thesis of Humean Supervenience (HS).
Humean supervenience ... is the doctrine that all there is to the world
is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing
and then another ... We have geometry: a system of external relations
of spatiotemporal points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe
point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those
points we have local quantities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties
which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated
(Lewis 1986, ix–x).
Later, in “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” we have,
Humean Supervenience ... says that in a world like ours, the funda-
mental relations are exactly the spacetime relations: distance relations,
both spacelike and timelike, and perhaps also occupancy relations be-
tween point-sized things and spacetime points. And it says that in a
world like ours, the fundamental properties are local quantities: per-
fectly natural intrinsic properties of points, or of point-sized occupants
of points. Therefore it says that all else supervenes on the spatiotem-
poral arrangement of local quantities throughout all of history, past
and present and future.
The picture is inspired by classical physics (Lewis 1994, 474).
The primary motivation behind Humean Supervenience is the idea that laws
of nature are compact summaries of patterns in non-nomic facts. Lewis’ state-
ment of HS commits him to pointillisme, but it is not clear that this is essential to
the core idea. A Lewisian metaphysician might be satisfied with properties that
are extrinsic but local: note that in the first quotation Lewis first refers to “local
matters of particular fact,” and then proceeds to put a pointilliste slant on this,
and in the second quotation “local quantities” is glossed as assignments of intrin-
sic properties to points. It is not clear that Lewis is distinguishing between local
matters of particular fact and matters of particular fact intrinsic to points. One
could, perhaps, without doing too much violence to Lewis’ intentions, advance a
version of Humean supervenience that has all else supervene on local matters of
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fact, construed as assignments of intrinsic properties to arbitrarily small neigh-
borhoods of points.13 This version of Humean Supervenience would be committed
only to some version of Patchy Separability.
Some version, but which? Patchy Separability, which requires the state of any
part of the world to supervene of state-assignments to coverings by arbitrarily
small patches, or Global Patchy Separability, which only requires this to be true
of the whole world? The language “all there is to the world” in the first quotation
suggests the global version. If we take it this way, and replace talk of properties
intrinsic to points with talk of local properties, then, in spite of the nonsepara-
bility evinced by classical electromagnetism in the holonomy representation, this
nonseparability is compatible with Humean supervenience—as long as spacetime
is simply connected. That it matters which of these two versions of separability
we consider is perhaps surprising. There is a temptation to think that, if the state
of the whole world supervenes on assignments of intrinsic properties to arbitrarily
small patches of it, the same must be true of any subregion of the world. One
lesson from the holonomy interpretation of electromagnetism is that this need not
be the case. Global Patchy Separability does not entail Patchy Separability.
It seems that Global Patchy Separability ought to be enough to satisfy the
intuitions that underwrite the thesis of Humean supervenience. If Global Patchy
Separability is satisfied, then the state of the world can be specified by an assign-
ment of local properties to arbitrarily small patches, and laws can be taken to
be patterns in such assignments. Thus, it seems that Healey overstates matters
when he says that any kind of non-separability violates Humean supervenience
(Healey, 2007, 124).14
The underlying idea of Humean Supervenience is that laws are nothing more
than compact summaries of patterns in the Humean mosaic. A Humean could
think of a holonomy on a spatial hypersurface, assigning holonomy values to loops
within that hypersuface, as a specification of the Humean mosaic at an instant of
time, and the law of evolution by which holonomies on one spacelike hypersurface
determine holonomies on other hypersurfaces as laws of nature. However, as
13It is worth noting in connection with this that Lewis intends a vector field to
be an arrangement of local quantities (Lewis, 1994, 474) . And so it is, but, as we
have discussed, the vector assigned to a point by a vector field should be taken to
be a local but extrinsic property of that point.
14One might also consider a version of Humean Supervenience (or, rather, a
thesis like Humean Supervenience) that captures the basic intuition that laws
are no more than patterns in non-nomic facts, without Lewis’ commitment to
separability, of any sort. This has been suggested by Chris Smeenk (2009) in a
review of Healey’s book, citing Earman and Roberts (2005) for the idea.
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already mentioned, the holonomy-values assigned to spatial loops, even within a
single hypersurface of simultaneity, are not independent of each other, as they
must satisfy the loop composition condition,
H(l1 ⊕ l2) = H(l1)H(l2).
Are these dependencies also to be regarded as laws of nature? If so, then these
laws of nature dictate relations within a spacelike slice of spacetime, and cannot
be regarded as laws of evolution, specifying a relation between the state of a part
of a spacetime and the state of its causal past. The sorts of dependencies encoded
in the loop composition condition are not of the familiar sort that we expect to
be expressed in physical laws. Is there an alternative?
A consequence of the loop composition condition is what Healey (2007, 122)
calls loop supervenience, the requirement that the holonomy properties of any loop
be determined by the holonomy properties of the loops that compose it, on any
decomposition. One way of thinking about this is to regard loop composition as
something analogous to fusion of parts into a whole; loop supervenience is, on
this way of thinking, analogous to the requirement that properties of a whole be
determined by the properties of its parts, on any decomposition.
One might be tempted to say that the relation of a composite loop to its
components just is an instance of the part-whole relation (this is suggested by
Healey (2007, 125)). On this view, l1 is to be thought of as a proper part of l3 if
there exists a loop l2 such that l3 = l1⊕ l2. If we accept this mereology, then loop
supervenience is simply the natural requirement that the properties of a whole be
determined by the properties of its parts.
Things are not quite as simple as this way of thinking about it may make it
appear. That is because the loop composition relation does not respect the rules
that mereology would lead us to expect it to. We would expect that if l1 is a part
of l3, l3 is a part of l1 only if l1 = l3, and that, if l1 is a proper part of l3, then l3
is not a proper part of l1. These conditions do not hold for loop composition; if
l3 = l1 ⊕ l2,
then
l1 = l3 ⊕ l¯2,
where l¯2 is l2 with orientation reversed. Construing loop composition as a part-
whole relation would require us to say that, whenever a loop l1 is a proper part
of a loop l3, it is always the case that l3 is a proper part of l1.
Accepting this would do too much violence to our mereology. The Humean
would be better off to avoid this mereological havoc, and take loop composition as
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analogous to fusion, with the crucial difference being that for every loop there is a
loop of the opposite sense, such that composition of a loop and its inverse cancel
each other out as far as holonomies are concerned. It still seems a viable option
to regard the loop composition condition as no more metaphysically suspect than
the requirement that, say, the mass of an object be the sum of the masses of the
parts that compose it.
There remains another complication.15 Note that, in the passage quoted from
“Humean Supervenience Debugged,” Humean supervenience is a thesis about
“worlds like ours,” not just about our world.16 If we take this to be integral
to the thesis, then, if Humean supervenience is to hold at a world w, then it must
also hold in some “neighbourhood” of w, consisting of the worlds that are like w.
Suppose we take a classical world w with a simply connected spacetime, and con-
sider the class of worlds that are just like w, except that an infinite open cylinder
has been removed from space, and holonomy values other than 1 are permitted
for loops that circle the missing cylinder. Do these count as worlds like w, or not?
Lewis’ “inner sphere” of possibility consists of those worlds that contain no
natural properties or relations that are alien to this world (Lewis, 1986, x). A
change in the topology of spacetime, therefore, does not entail a move out of the
inner sphere. But not all worlds in the inner sphere are “worlds like ours” (Lewis,
1994, 474–75). The question, then, is: should a Lewisian metaphysician count
worlds with distinct spacetime topologies as unlike each other? Prima facie, the
answer would seem to be no; removal of a chunk of w’s spacetime produces a world
that is still like w. If that is right, and if HS is taken to hold at a world w only if
it also holds in worlds like w, then classical electromagnetism, on the holonomy
interpretation, violates Humean supervenience, whether or not spacetime is simply
connected.
But perhaps a classical world with a multiply-connected spacetime should
be counted as relevantly unlike a classical world with a simply connected space-
time. When it comes to doing physics—and, in particular, when it comes to doing
electromagnetism— the difference is not a minor one. In a simply-connected space-
15This point was raised by Richard Healey in his remarks at the Author Meets
Critics Session at the Meeting of the Pacific APA, April 9, 2009.
16It might sound odd to some readers—I hope it sounds odd to some readers—
that a thesis “inspired by classical physics” might be thought to hold of worlds like
ours, in spite of evidence that classical physics is not fundamental. Lewis in 1986
declared himself “not ready to take lessons in ontology from quantum physics as
it now is.” This doesn’t affect the project of this paper, whose concern is how we
should think of the classical theories that apply, in some approximation, to our
world.
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time, specifying the electromagnetic field tensor field Fµν suffices to determine the
holonomy associated with any loop; this is not the case for a multiply-connected
spacetime. This also has consequences for the quantum theory of a charged parti-
cle; there are inequivalent quantizations corresponding to different holonomies on
loops that circle the missing cylinder (see Belot (1998, §4.1) for discussion). . So
perhaps a world that differs from w in having a cylinder removed is not a world
like w, after all.
7 Conclusion
There can be nonseparability in classical physics. This is the surprising lesson
of the holonomy interpretation of classical electromagnetism. However, this non-
separability has nothing to do with entanglement, which remains a non-classical
phenomenon, and is decidedly weaker than quantum nonseparability. The classi-
cal nonseparability we have found in electromagnetism is compatible with suitably
restricted separability theses, such as Patchy Separability for Simply Connected
Regions, and, in a simply connected world, Global Patchy Separability. Fur-
thermore, though Lewis included a commitment to separability, and, indeed, to
Pointilliste Separability in his statement of Humean Supervenience, it seems that
the holonomy interpretation of classical electromagnetism can still respect the ba-
sic intuitions underlying HS. I conclude that, though the nonseparability exhibited
by classical electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation is something that
should give the conservative classical metaphysician pause, it’s nothing that the
ccm should lose sleep over.
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